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Kristen Hopewell
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ABSTRACT
This article shows how China’s rise has radically altered the politics of one of the
most prominent and controversial issues in the global trading system: agriculture
subsidies. Agriculture subsidies depress global prices and undermine the competi-
tiveness and livelihoods of poor farmers, and therefore have been long seen as a
symbol of the injustice of the trading system. The issue has traditionally been under-
stood in North-South terms, with developed countries seen as the perpetrators of
harm and developing countries as innocent victims. In this article, however, I chal-
lenge this prevailing conception of the agricultural subsidies issue, arguing that it is
now out of date and no longer corresponds with the emerging reality. A momen-
tous but underappreciated change has taken place, largely beneath the radar of IPE
scholarship: China has emerged as the world’s largest subsidizer, profoundly trans-
forming the global politics of agricultural subsidies. From a North-South battle, WTO
negotiations on agricultural subsidies are now primarily centered on a conflict
between the US and China. While reducing subsidies remains a pressing concern for
developing countries, efforts to negotiate new and strengthened disciplines at the
WTO have been thwarted by an impasse between the two dominant powers.
KEYWORDS China; US; agricultural subsidies; World Trade Organization (WTO); trade; global economic
governance; trade negotiations
The US has long been the dominant state in the global economy and its govern-
ance. Yet, after four decades of rapid and sustained economic growth, China has
now emerged as the world’s leading trading state and second largest economy.
Understanding the implications of a rising China has become a central preoccupa-
tion of scholars and policymakers alike. Fueled by its growing economic might,
China is demanding a greater role in global economic governance. The US and
China are competing not only for economic primacy but also for power in the
institutions that set the rules of the global economy (Quark, 2013). A key question
is how China’s rise will affect the existing system of global economic governance
constructed under American hegemony (Gray & Murphy, 2015; Lesage & Van de
Graaf, 2015). This article contributes to our understanding of the implications of
China’s rise by analyzing its impact on one of the most high-profile and conten-
tious issues in the multilateral trading system: agricultural subsidies.
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The case of agricultural subsidies provides a striking illustration of how China’s
rise is transforming the dynamics of contestation in global trade governance.
Agricultural subsidies have long been seen as a symbol of the hypocrisy of the US
and other rich countries and the injustice of the trading system (Bukovansky, 2010;
Singh, 2017). Subsidies provided by rich countries distort global markets and
depress prices, undermining the competitiveness and incomes of poor farmers in
the developing world. There is widespread consensus that reducing agricultural
subsidies would increase the welfare of developing countries and the world’s poor-
est and most vulnerable agricultural producers. Agricultural subsidies emerged as a
central issue in the WTO Doha Round of trade negotiations, where reducing rich
country subsidies became the key unifying demand of developing countries and
helped to transform the WTO into a North-South battleground (Clapp, 2006). The
primary axis of conflict in WTO negotiations on agricultural subsidies has thus
been understood as lying between North and South: developed countries have been
seen as the perpetrators of harm and developing countries as innocent victims.
In this article, however, I argue that this conventional understanding of the
international politics of agricultural subsidies is no longer accurate. In recent years,
China has emerged as the world’s largest subsidizer of agriculture, with substantial
implications for global markets and trade. China’s emergence as a major subsidizer,
I contend, upends the entrenched conception of agricultural subsidies as a harm
perpetrated by the Global North upon the Global South. Moreover, as I show, agri-
cultural subsidies are once again at the center of the agenda at the WTO: since the
collapse of the Doha Round, states have identified this as a priority area of negotia-
tions, seeking to achieve a standalone agreement to reduce global agricultural subsi-
dies. The axis of conflict, however, has shifted profoundly. Rather than a battle
drawn firmly on North-South lines, the conflict over agricultural subsidies is now
centered primarily on the US and China. While reducing subsidies remains a press-
ing concern for developing countries, conflict between the US and China has pro-
duced an impasse, blocking new disciplines on agricultural subsidies at the WTO.
China – along with the US – is now the principal barrier to establishing stricter
global trade rules on agricultural subsidies.
The article is organized as follows. The next section details the ‘old’ politics of
agricultural subsidies at the WTO, characterized as a battle between the Global
North and South during the Doha Round. The following section then charts how
China’s rise is transforming the global landscape of agricultural subsidies.
Subsequent sections examine the resulting ‘new’ politics of agricultural subsidies at
the WTO, since the Doha collapse. The first analyzes the positions of the two dom-
inant players in the new conflict over agriculture subsidies, the US and China. The
second explains why a clash between these two powers has produced an impasse in
the post-Doha negotiations on agricultural subsidies. The third demonstrates how,
although global subsidy disciplines remain a crucial priority for developing coun-
tries, their interests have been sidelined amid the conflict between the system’s two
dominant powers. The concluding section presents cotton as an illustrative example
to underscore how WTO agricultural subsidy negotiations have come to be domi-
nated by US-China conflict, with significant implications for developing countries
in particular. This analysis draws from a larger project examining shifting power at
the WTO, involving field research conducted between 2007 and 2018, at the WTO
in Geneva, as well as in Beijing, Washington, New Delhi, Sao Paulo, and Brasilia,
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including over 200 interviews with WTO negotiators, senior officials, and represen-
tatives of industry and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); over 300 hours of
ethnographic observation; and extensive documentary analysis.
Traditional understanding of agricultural subsidies at the WTO
A multitude of actors – including developing countries, NGOs, the World Bank,
IMF, UN, and the international media – have denounced the subsidies provided by
the US and other rich countries, decrying their impact on the welfare of poor
countries (Bukovansky, 2010). Arguably no other issue in the multilateral trading
system has generated as much public attention and outrage around the world. As
Matthew Eagleton-Pierce (2012: 85) argues, agricultural subsidies have ‘served as a
touchstone for deeper concerns about economic and political justice within North-
South relations’.
Agricultural subsidies and other forms of protection are widely seen as tools
that have been used to ‘tilt the global trade field in favor of developed nations’
(Singh, 2014). Identifying the US and EU as the worst offenders, Oxfam (2002: 96,
112) argues that their agricultural subsidies ‘have devastating effects on poor farm-
ers in developing countries’, who are ‘losing global markets and facing ruinous
competition from subsidized exports’. As Oxfam notes, ‘these subsidies have a
major bearing on the structure of competition in international markets’, such that
‘farmers in the poorest nations’ are forced to compete ‘against the financial power
of the world’s richest countries’. Focusing on cotton, a columnist for the Financial
Times writes:
It is no exaggeration to say that the lower prices created by US subsidies almost certainly
cost thousands of lives a year as desperately poor people who grow cotton as their main
cash crop are unable to pay for food, clean water and healthcare. … [B]etraying millions
of the poorest people in the world because of a small cabal of rich, well-organized welfare-
scrounging farmers … the US in this matter has proven to be a selfish, craven malefactor.
(Beattie, 2014)
The prevailing understanding of agricultural subsidies thus identifies rich coun-
tries as the clear ‘villains’ (Oxfam, 2005: 19) and developing countries as
their victims.
For many, agricultural subsidies epitomize the ‘rigged rules and double standards’
of the trading system, as Oxfam put it – the unfairness of global trade rules and
how they are structured against the world’s poorest countries. With the majority of
the population in the developing world employed in agriculture, agriculture is vital
to livelihoods, employment and food security in developing countries (Eagleton-
Pierce, 2012). However, while agriculture is one of the most important areas of
international trade for many developing countries, free trade has been only partially
and unevenly applied to agriculture, which remains one of the least liberalized sec-
tors of global trade (Clapp, 2006). The rules of the trading system have been heavily
shaped by power asymmetries: historically dominated by the US, EU and other
advanced-industrialized states, liberalization was concentrated in their areas of
export competitiveness, while areas of greatest importance to developing countries –
such as agriculture – remained heavily protected (Muzaka & Bishop, 2015).
Agriculture was only brought into the trading system with the Uruguay Round in
1995, and the gains promised to developing countries failed to materialize:
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 3
developed countries continued to provide high levels of subsidies, with harmful con-
sequences for poor farmers throughout the developing world. Since reducing agri-
cultural subsidies is recognized as one of the key ways that global trade rules can
help promote international development and alleviate poverty, the issue has been
identified as a ‘litmus test’ of whether the WTO can work for the poor (Hopewell,
2016) and indeed ‘a test of the legitimacy of the WTO system as a whole’ (Quark,
2013: 129).
During the Doha Round, the emerging powers formed a coalition of developing
countries – the Group of 20 (G20), representing over half of the world’s population
and two-thirds of its farmers, with broad-based support from the rest of the devel-
oping world – to counter the US and other advanced-industrialized states and press
those countries for agricultural reforms, particularly on subsidies (Clapp, 2006;
Narlikar & Wilkinson, 2004). By challenging rich country agriculture subsidies, the
G20 – under the leadership of Brazil and India, and backed by China – enabled
developing countries to seize the offensive against the US and other advanced-
industrialized states and make their protectionist policies a key target at the WTO
(Hopewell, 2016; Muzaka & Bishop, 2015). For the first time, the US – historically
the key aggressor in the GATT/WTO – found itself increasingly isolated and on
the defensive, while developing countries assumed the role of demandeurs. In add-
ition, Brazil – with China, India and numerous developing countries as third par-
ties – launched and won landmark WTO disputes against US cotton and EU sugar
subsidies. The activism of the emerging powers on agriculture subsidies profoundly
altered the dynamics and agenda of the Doha Round and helped to catalyze
broader power shifts at the WTO, challenging the unfettered dominance of the US
and other advanced-industrialized states (Hopewell, 2016). The Doha Round came
to be defined by a conflict between developed and developing countries, focused
heavily on agricultural subsidies (Singh, 2017).
As the following analysis will show, however, amid the rise of China, the inter-
national politics of agricultural subsidies have changed dramatically, such that they
are virtually unrecognizable from just a decade ago. The agricultural subsidies issue
was previously conceived in North-South terms, with a clear set of villains (devel-
oped countries) and victims (developing countries). If rich countries have been
seen as the villains on the agricultural subsidies issue, it is because, as Oxfam
(2005: 20) could accurately state until recently: ‘WTO figures show that developed
countries are almost exclusively responsible for the problems of trade distortion
caused by farm subsidies. Agricultural support in developing countries is marginal
in comparison’. Today, however, this no longer holds true. China – a developing
country – is now the world’s largest subsidizer. The contemporary politics of agri-
cultural subsidies cannot be understood by focusing solely on the policies of the
US and other developed countries. New fault lines are emerging, which are far
more complex than the North-South struggle that characterized the Doha Round.
This article draws attention to a lesser known aspect of China’s economic trans-
formation and its changing role in the global political economy. China is primarily
seen as a manufacturing powerhouse and rising financial power. But what is often
missed amid the focus on the extraordinary growth of its manufacturing sector is
that, thanks to a dramatic expansion in agricultural production, China is now the
world’s largest agricultural producer. Given its large domestic market, most of its
agricultural output is consumed internally, but China has still become the world’s
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fourth largest agricultural exporter (WTO, 2017b). Like the US and Europe, China
is now both a major industrial economy and a leading agricultural producer and
exporter. Indeed, China’s rise is part of a larger reconfiguration of global agricul-
tural production and trade flows from the traditionally dominant grain-producing
nations of the US, EU, Canada and Australia to emerging ‘agro-powers’ in the
Global South (Margulis, 2014). Moreover, China enjoys tremendous power in glo-
bal agriculture due to the size of its market and its importance as an importer
(Quark, 2013). While frequently overlooked, this side of China – its role as a major
agricultural power – has significant consequences for global trade politics.
China’s agricultural subsidies boom
There has been a profound change in the global landscape of agricultural subsidies
and the politics surrounding this issue at the WTO. As China and other emerging
economies have grown richer, they have become major subsidizers of agriculture.
China has transitioned from taxing its rural sector to providing subsidies in order
to support farmers’ incomes and incentivize domestic production. This is not
unique to China – other emerging economies, such as India, Indonesia, Philippines
and Turkey, have similarly increased their agricultural support. Consequently, as
one former negotiator summarized, ‘the real problem with agricultural subsidies is
increasingly in developing countries, not developed countries anymore’.1
Over the past two decades, agricultural support in developed countries has fallen
steadily, but China’s support has risen dramatically. As a result, China surpassed
the OECD average in 2013, with its support to producers reaching more than 20%
of farm receipts in 2015 (Figure 1). China’s total support to agriculture, at 2.4% of
GDP, is now four times higher than the OECD average (OECD, 2017). China pro-
vided an estimated $212 billion in farm subsidies in 2016, significantly more than
the EU ($100 billion), US ($33 billion), or any other country (OECD, 2017).
In China, state support now represents a significant portion of revenue for
many commodities: subsidies constitute 38% of gross farm receipts for wheat, 29%
Figure 1. Producer support estimate as % of gross farm receipts, 1995–2015.
Source: OECD.
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for corn, 32% for rice, 49% for sugar, and 44% for cotton, far greater than the lev-
els of subsidization provided in the US (Figure 2).
It is not just the volume of support that a country provides that matters but the
form in which that support is provided. Certain types of subsidies distort trade far
more than others. The most heavily trade-distorting subsidies are those that incen-
tivize increased production (such as price supports or subsidies linked to inputs or
output levels), whereas income support payments decoupled from production are
among the least trade-distorting. While developed countries have been moving
towards less-trade distorting forms of support, China’s subsidies are concentrated
in the most trade-distorting forms of support. China is now providing more trade-
distorting subsidies than the US or EU (OECD, 2017). In China, support to agri-
cultural producers represented 15% of gross farm receipts in 2014–16, with 74%
provided via the most trade distorting forms of support (Figure 3). By comparison,
support to farmers in the US constituted 9% of gross farm receipts, with 33% pro-
vided in the most trade distorting forms of support.
China’s support to agriculture is dominated by market price support, direct pay-
ments based on production, and input subsidies, which are the most trade-distort-
ing means of providing agricultural assistance. Market price support, through the
purchase of commodities by state agencies at a minimum guaranteed price, repre-
sents an important pillar of China’s agricultural support. Following the 2007–08
Global Food Crisis, which heightened food security concerns (Margulis, 2014),
China doubled the value of its agricultural support (Gale, 2013). Between 2008 and
2015, support prices were raised for wheat by 58%, corn by 50% and rice by 80%
(USDA, 2015a). China now accounts for more than half of the world’s support for
rice and more than three-quarters of support for corn (Greenville, 2017).
China’s policy of supporting producers through the purchase of agricultural
commodities at above-market prices has led to the accumulation of massive state
reserves. China has amassed 60% of the world’s cotton supplies, over 50% of its
corn, 40% of wheat and 21% of soybeans (Rabobank, 2016). To dispose of these
large stocks, the government auctions them off below cost, while using various
measures to discourage imports. Given the size of its state reserves, China’s policies
exert ‘a colossal influence’ on world prices (Rabobank, 2016). China’s mass sell-off
Figure 2. Transfers to specific commodities, 2014–16.
Source: OECD.
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of sugar from its reserves in 2016, for example, helped to push the global price of
sugar down by almost a quarter (Mera, 2017).
The impact of China’s policies is magnified by its increasing centrality in global
agriculture. China’s agricultural production has grown dramatically: its share of
global production has more than doubled, from 18% in 1995–97 to 43% in
2014–16 (Figure 4). Since China is now the world’s largest producer and consumer
of agricultural products, its policies have a profound impact on global markets and
trade (Gale, 2013). Although the commodities it subsidizes are primarily sold in
the domestic market rather than exported, as one WTO official stated, China ‘is
just such an enormous import market that its impact on global trade patterns is
extremely significant’.2 China’s subsidies artificially boost its agricultural produc-
tion, resulting in reduced demand for imports and lower global prices, to the detri-
ment of agricultural producers and exporters around the world (Gale, 2013; Mera,
2017; Rabobank, 2016).
From villain to victim? The US position
The US and other advanced-industrialized states, as the world’s biggest subsidizers
at that time, were the primary targets of subsidy reduction efforts in the Doha
Round. But, since the collapse of the Doha Round, prompted by the boom in
China’s agriculture subsidies, the US has turned the tables and gone on the offen-
sive against China’s subsidies in both WTO negotiations and dispute settlement. Of
course, the US has defensive motives for targeting China’s subsidies: it is happy to
deflect attention from its own subsidies and shift the blame elsewhere. But the US
also has significant commercial interests at stake: as the world’s biggest agricultural
exporter, the US has a major interest in securing a reduction in Chinese subsidies.
Moreover, the issue is also linked to broader issues of economic competition and
geopolitical rivalry between the US and China.
Ironically, the US – long seen as the villain in this area – has increasingly come
to view itself as a victim of China’s agricultural subsidies. The level of support the
US provides to its agricultural producers has been consistently below the OECD
average and falling over time (OECD, 2017). Since the Uruguay Round, and the
Brazil cotton dispute, the US has reformed its own farm programs, shifting towards
less trade-distorting forms of support. The US’s producer support declined from
Figure 3. Composition of producer support estimate, 2014–16 (% of gross farm receipts).
Source: OECD.
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21% of gross farm receipts in 1986–88 to 9% in 2014–16, with the proportion pro-
vided in the most trade-distorting forms of support falling from 51% to 33%
(OECD, 2017). Yet now, the US finds its chief market and competitor, China, mov-
ing in the opposite direction. Today, as one negotiator stated, China is
‘comprehensively outspending them in a way the US can’t respond to because of
its fiscal limitations and its WTO limits on production-linked spending’.3 From the
US’s perspective, to quote one of its former negotiators, not only are China’s subsi-
dies ‘distorting world markets but they have become significantly more trade-dis-
torting than subsidies in developed countries’ and ‘the US, as the biggest
agricultural exporter, suffers most from these distortions’.4
Agriculture is important to the US economy as a major source of exports.
Accounting for 10% of total exports, agriculture is one of the few sectors of the US
economy that runs a trade surplus, helping to reduce the size of the nation’s overall
trade deficit (USDA, 2015c). American agriculture depends heavily on foreign mar-
kets, with more than a third of farm revenues generated from exports (USDA,
2015c). For some commodities, such as wheat, rice and cotton, export markets
absorb half or more of US output (CRS, 2017). While the US remains the world’s
leading agricultural exporter, its dominance has been substantially eroded. Its share
of global grain exports has fallen from 65% in the mid-1970s to 30% today
(Newman & McGroarty, 2017). The US agriculture industry identifies two key fac-
tors behind its declining market share: the rise of new competitors and the use of
protectionist trade policies by other states.5 According to the House Agriculture
Committee Chair: ‘One of the biggest impacts to the health of the US agriculture
industry is competition from foreign governments – in particular foreign subsidies
and tariffs’.6
As the largest market for US exports, China is a key focus. US agricultural
exports to China peaked in 2012 at $26 billion, but in subsequent years fell by over
25% (USDA, 2016a). This precipitous decline was caused primarily by China’s subsi-
dies and bulging reserves. The US believes its exports would be considerably higher
if not for Chinese subsidies and trade barriers: ‘we could be doing much better if
Figure 4. Country shares in total agricultural value added, 2014–16.
Source: OECD.
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our exports could compete in China on a level playing field’ (US, 2016b). The US
wheat industry, for instance, maintains that China’s subsidies cost world wheat
exporters $3 billion in lost revenue annually, with American farmers specifically los-
ing over $650 million.7 It estimates that removal of China’s price support program
for wheat would boost the country’s imports by nearly 10 million metric tons and
raise world prices by 3%; US exports alone would rise by 6% or 1.5 million tons
(Inside US-China Trade, 2016a). In addition to distortions caused by subsidies, sig-
nificant tariff and non-tariff barriers also restrict access to the Chinese market. The
US Chamber of Commerce (2016) estimates that US agricultural exports could
increase by $12 billion if China’s agricultural trade barriers were eliminated.
The US launched two disputes in 2016 challenging China’s subsidies and admin-
istration of its tariff rate quotas (TRQs) for grains (wheat, rice and corn).
Washington alleges that the subsidies China is providing via its price support pro-
grams exceed its WTO commitments by nearly $100 billion. While the case only
challenges China’s market price support for grains, US producers maintain that
other subsidies – including direct payments and input subsidies – would increase
China’s violation of its WTO obligations even further, and they allege similar
dynamics are present in other commodities (Inside US-China Trade, 2016c). The
US also alleges that China has been restricting its TRQs – which require quantities
of a product imported within a quota to be charged a lower tariff – to block
imports. In the case of wheat, for instance, China’s WTO commitments require it
to implement an annual 9.64 million metric ton TRQ. Since world prices are lower
than Chinese prices, China should be importing large quantities of wheat, putting
its TRQ utilization at or near 100%. But, instead, China has repeatedly filled only
about one-third of its TRQ, allegedly because 90% is administered by state-owned
enterprises, which have been ordered by the government not to import wheat
(Inside US-China Trade, 2016b). If China’s TRQs had been fully utilized, the US
argues that China would have imported an additional $3.5 billion worth of grain in
2015 alone (US, 2016a). Nearly 30 other countries have joined the cases as third
parties, including other major grain exporters.
China’s stance: developing country means developing country
Despite growing pressure, China has intensely opposed efforts to discipline its subsi-
dies at the WTO. China objects to even being called a ‘large subsidizer’ or classified
with countries like the US. Its negotiators stress that China remains a developing
country – albeit an upper-middle income one – with a GDP per capita of just $8000,
compared to $57,000 for the US.8 Chinese officials emphasize that average farm size
is far smaller in China and, on a per capita basis, the levels of support it provides are
considerably lower than the US or other advanced-industrialized states. China there-
fore insists, as one of its negotiators stated, that ‘you cannot just ask China, because
it is a big economy, to make the same cuts [to its subsidies] as others’.9
China justifies its subsidies on the grounds of its own national development
goals, including promoting food security and rural development. Nearly half of
China’s population remains rural, with a third of the population employed in agri-
culture.10 Poverty is concentrated in rural areas, and the income gap between
urban and rural households is among the largest in the world (Frazier, 2013). Since
the early 2000s, one of China’s central policy objectives has been to raise the
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incomes of its large rural population and reduce growing income disparities
between rural and urban areas. The Communist Party views urban-rural inequality
as potentially destabilizing and a threat to its grip on power. Consequently, as one
former Chinese negotiator indicated, ‘Agriculture is a very difficult and very polit-
ical issue for China. To simply ask China to stop providing domestic support [to
agriculture] is political suicide. In China, the priority of agriculture is indisputable,
no one can challenge it.’11
China’s subsidies are also driven by the desire to secure domestic supply. It has
set the goal of achieving 95% self-sufficiency in wheat and rice, which are seen as
strategic commodities. China’s emphasis on ensuring food security through self-
sufficiency is shaped by its recent historical experience of hunger and famine, along
with concerns about the possibility of future conflict with the US. As a former
Chinese negotiator explained:
The top agricultural exporters – where are they from? The US and EU – they control a big
part of world production and exports. Imagine if we have a change in the political
situation, like a new cold war, or a real war, where could China buy its food? Food
security is not just about whether there is an international market but where your food is
coming from and whether you will always be able buy the food you need.12
China’s food reserves are part of a larger ‘grand reserve system’ directed at crisis
prevention through self-insuring, which is seen as necessary for national defense,
economic security and social stability (Chin, 2010).
Price support and general input subsidies have been the main instruments used
in China, because these policies yield quick returns and are relatively easy to oper-
ate, as opposed to less trade-distorting direct support, which is less effective in
boosting food production (ICTSD, 2015). Critics argue, however, that if its object-
ive is to support its farmers, China has other, more effective policy options at its
disposal, which would have less harmful effects on global markets and producers in
other countries. There are also better ways to address rural poverty and support
rural development, including through providing improved rural pensions, health-
care, education and infrastructure (OECD, 2017). But China has vigorously
defended its agricultural subsidies at the WTO, maintaining that it is providing
‘necessary and essential support’ to its rural sector (Inside U.S. Trade, 2017a).
Indeed, China argues that it is simply claiming the right to support its agricultural
sector, as the US and other advanced-industrialized states have long done.
The soaring costs of its stockpiles have prompted China to undertake some
reforms of its farm programs – such as moving from government purchases to
other forms of support for some commodities – but its new programs remain pro-
duction and trade distorting (Hejazi & Marchant, 2017). China’s reforms have been
driven by domestic considerations, rather than external forces or concerns about
the effects of its policies on global markets or foreign producers. And they have
not in any way altered China’s negotiating stance or willingness to accept disci-
plines from the WTO. As one negotiator stated, ‘China is going to reform when
they are ready, regardless of what is going on at the WTO’.13 China wants to maxi-
mize its policy flexibility, including maintaining the option to increase its subsidies
in the future – which is why China has fiercely resisted any new disciplines on its
agricultural support at the WTO.
China, like many developing countries, views the WTO’s existing subsidy rules –
established in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and heavily
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shaped by the US and EU – as unbalanced. Subsidies (‘domestic support’) are classi-
fied into different ‘boxes’ based on the degree to which they distort production and
trade: the ‘Amber Box’ is for trade-distorting subsidies, such as measures related to
production level or selling price; the ‘Blue Box’ encompasses direct payments to
farmers made under production-limiting programs; ‘Green Box’ support is that with
no, or minimal, distortive effects on trade; and Article 6.2 (the ‘Development Box’)
provides an exemption allowing developing countries to provide certain investment
and input subsidies for development purposes. The AoA established limits solely on
the trade-distorting, or Amber Box, support that states can provide. For countries
with high levels of support at that time, their Amber Box support was capped and
subject to reductions (typically by 20%); the resulting new limit is referred to as a
country’s bound ‘Aggregate Measure of Support’ (AMS). De minimis provisions
allow minimal levels of Amber Box support (5% of the value of production for
developed countries and 10% for developing countries) to be exempt from the cal-
culation of current AMS. The US, for example, was given a bound AMS (of $19.1
billion), plus allowed to exempt de minimis levels of support from the calculation of
its current AMS. In contrast, most developing countries, which had little or no
domestic support at that time, were not given a bound AMS. Consequently, for
those countries, including China, its de minimis threshold acts as an effective limit
on domestic support. In sum, while developed countries were given AMS entitle-
ments plus di minimis exemptions, most developing countries were limited to di
minimis. Developing countries have long criticized these rules as unfair, allowing
developed countries that historically provided large amounts of trade-distorting sup-
port the flexibility to continue doing so (Clapp, 2006).
From China’s perspective, these iniquities were compounded by the terms of its
WTO accession. China has no AMS entitlement, its de minimis commitments
(8.5%) are lower than other developing countries (10%), and it is not entitled to the
Article 6.2 exemptions afforded to other developing countries. As one negotiator
noted, ‘China paid heavily in its accession and doesn’t want to again’.14 Another ela-
borated: ‘Even if you look at agriculture alone, they gave up too much to enter the
organization – AMS, Article 6.2, di minimis. From their perspective, other members
should come to their level before they make further reforms’.15 In short, for China:
Its position is that ‘we were promised in our accession negotiations that the Doha Round
would be concluded with the US taking major cuts to AMS’. That was the implicit deal
and how it was sold to stakeholders and even some in the Chinese bureaucracy. Their lack
of flexibility is a function of this. They feel cheated. For them, it’s a question of fairness.16
China thus maintains that it should not have to accept any further disciplines
on its subsidies because its existing commitments already exceed those of other
developing country members. Instead, it argues, the responsibility lies on the US
and other developed countries to do more in reducing their subsidies, to live up to
the promises made to China during its accession and developing countries more
broadly in the Doha Round.
Post-Doha negotiations on agriculture subsidies
Agricultural subsidies have re-emerged as a central and highly contentious issue in
WTO negotiations, but the terms of the debate have shifted significantly. Since the
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collapse of the Doha Round, the WTO has focused on negotiating targeted agree-
ments on specific trade issues, leading to the successful conclusion of agreements
on trade facilitation and agricultural export competition, for example, in 2013 and
2015 (Margulis, 2018; Wilkinson, Hannah, & Scott, 2014). Since 2015, there has
been a push to negotiate a standalone agreement on domestic support for agricul-
ture. However, these efforts have run aground due to a US-China standoff. The US
has refused to cut its subsidies unless China does the same, but China has refused,
insisting that as a developing country, it should not be forced to cut its subsidies.
China maintains that any negotiations on domestic support should be based on the
final draft agriculture text that emerged from the Doha Round in 2008 (known as
‘Rev4’), immediately prior to the round’s collapse. China is unwilling to accept
more onerous commitments than those outlined in Rev4, which did not require
any cuts to its domestic support – and the US refuses to accept Rev4 as the basis
for negotiations for precisely that reason.
Rev4 introduced a new measure of support – Overall Trade Distorting Support
(OTDS), which includes AMS, de minimis and blue box support – and used tiered
cuts to OTDS and AMS, with the countries that provided the largest amounts of
support in the past undertaking the greatest reductions. The US and EU would cut
OTDS by 70% and 80% respectively.17 Under Rev4, the US’s bound OTDS would
decline from $48.5 billion to $14.5 billion and its bound AMS of $19.1 billion
would drop to $7.6 billion ( Orden, 2013). Rev4 also introduced product-specific
caps on Amber and Blue Box support.
For most developed countries, their current WTO subsidy limits are so high
that the new disciplines introduced in Rev4 would just be cutting ‘water’ (the gap
between their actual and bound subsidy levels). At the time of negotiating those
terms in 2008, the US’s actual OTDS was less than $7 billion and thus far below its
proposed cap. Since then, however, its OTDS has been rising, due to a combination
of lower global prices and new domestic support policies introduced in the 2014
farm bill (Anderson, 2017). Now, the US is distinctly vulnerable to the proposed
caps under Rev 4, which would likely bite into its actual levels of domestic support.
Under the terms of Rev4, as a US negotiator summed up: ‘everyone else is OK, but
it’s the US that got trapped’.18
In contrast, Rev4 represented a highly favorable deal for China. Since 2005, in
the Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration, it had been agreed that ‘developing coun-
try members with no AMS commitments will be exempt from reductions in de
minimis and the overall cut in trade-distorting domestic support’.19 This was reaf-
firmed in Rev4, which stated that developing countries without AMS entitlements
(like China) would not be required to undertake reduction commitments in their
OTDS.20 China maintains that any negotiations on domestic support must be based
on these previously agreed principles. They reflect a key promise of the Doha
Round: that developing countries would be granted ‘special and differential treat-
ment’ (SDT), including reduced liberalization commitments and greater flexibilities
and exemptions. China considers itself a developing country and staunchly main-
tains that it is entitled to the SDT promised to developing countries. Its negotiators
insist that the principles of SDT ‘should be fully preserved and for all members’
and identifies this as a ‘redline’ on which it is unwilling to budge (WTO, 2015).
China argues that, as a developing country, it is entitled to SDT and should not be
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required to make further concessions. From China’s perspective, the US is trying to
renege on the terms of the deal that had been broadly agreed in 2008.
The US, however, argues that China needs to agree to undertake cuts as part of
any multilateral deal on domestic support. The US has urged the WTO to ‘step
away from rigid notions of who is a developing country and what are their respon-
sibilities’ based on ‘an antiquated snapshot of the past’.21 According to the US
Trade Representative, ‘when major emerging economies are providing trade-distor-
tive agricultural subsidies at a greater volume than all of the developed countries
put together, we can no longer turn a blind eye’.22 Referencing the grain subsidy
dispute, in which the US asserts that China is providing nearly $100 billion per
year in trade-distorting subsidies above its WTO limits, he argued: ‘Think about
that for a minute. $100 billion is more than the GDP of 130 countries. How can
we have a serious conversation about distortions to global agricultural trade if we
pretend that trade-distortive subsidies at this level don’t exist?’23
The US agriculture industry is intensely frustrated that China, as one representa-
tive put it, ‘still wants to claim developing country status for agriculture and get
the benefits’.24 Another explained their resistance to Rev4 as follows: ‘We were
being sacrificed. The US was giving everything and getting nothing in return –
that’s just not going to fly’.25 According to a US congressional official, with Rev4:
‘our industry gets thrown under the bus, while China gets a completely free pass.
It’s pretty hard to swallow. … Especially since China impacts the market more
than us’.26 The US argues that the world has changed significantly and any agree-
ment on domestic support needs to reflect that new reality: as one negotiator put
it, ‘we need to look at this in the context of today’s data and negotiate from
there’.27 For the US, any agreement on domestic support where it is forced to
make significant cuts without concessions from China is a non-starter.
While the US led the charge against China’s agriculture subsidies, it has been
joined by others, including the EU, Australia, Canada, Brazil and other exporters.
According to one negotiator:
Most developed countries don’t think Rev4 is an acceptable starting point now. Our
analysis shows that it would mean real cuts into US domestic support while China would
be doing nothing. As much as we’d love to see the US reduce its subsidies, that’s just not
realistic. And Rev4 doesn’t meet our needs anymore because China wouldn’t be doing
anything. … Rev4 really reflects an outdated way of thinking about domestic support. To
us, all trade-distorting forms of support are problematic, regardless of which country is
providing them.28
The problem with Rev4, as one Secretariat official stated, is that it ‘targets those
who have been reducing their support and leaves off the hook those who are
increasing their subsidies’.29 As a negotiator noted:
There’s no way that’s going to happen. It’s just the political reality in the US. They can’t be
made to undergo reforms and tell their Congress and constituencies that China is carved
out. And it’s also systemically problematic, if just as the WTO is starting to discipline US
and EU subsidies, they are simply replaced by other big subsidizers.30
Other WTO members have sought to break the US-China deadlock, advancing
proposals targeting subsidies provided by both developed and emerging economies.
New Zealand led a group of exporters in putting forward a proposal to move
beyond the developed/developing country distinction by targeting a new category
of ‘major members’.31 Various exporters, including the EU, Brazil and others, have
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pushed for an overall limit on trade-distorting domestic support.32 There have also
been calls for product-specific caps, including for cotton. But China has refused to
budge, insisting that it will not accept any disciplines on its domestic support.
China’s position is supported by other emerging subsidizers. In July 2017, China
put forward a joint submission with India calling for the total elimination of exist-
ing AMS allowances for developed countries as a prerequisite for any further
reforms (such that their de minimis limit would become a de facto ceiling, as is
currently the case for most developing countries), while allowing developing coun-
tries to maintain their current de minimis flexibilities, without any new ceilings or
cuts (Bridges Weekly, 2017a). The proposal was supported by several emerging
economies, including Indonesia, Philippines and Turkey (Inside U.S. Trade, 2017b).
In effect, China has now moved beyond its insistence on Rev4 as the only accept-
able starting point for negotiations, but to an even more extreme position – where
the US and other developed countries would be required to do substantially more
than Rev4, while China and other emerging economies would still do nothing to
reduce their subsidies. Furthermore, the problem is that because agricultural pro-
duction has grown dramatically in China, so too has its de minimis limit (since it
is calculated as a percentage of the total value of production). With its current total
value of agricultural production at $1.4 trillion (OECD, 2017), China’s current
aggregate de minimis limit would permit it to spend up to an enormous $119 bil-
lion on trade-distorting subsidies – and China’s cap will continue to grow with the
value of agricultural production.
Negotiators report that China has assumed an ‘extremely defensive’ stance,
‘digging in its heels’ and refusing to discuss any reductions or disciplines on its
domestic support: China is ‘unwilling to accept any caps or make any commit-
ments at the WTO’.33 There is little to induce China to participate in a new WTO
subsidies agreement. As one negotiator observed:
China has no incentive to agree to a cap on domestic support. They don’t care about
reducing other countries’ domestic support, so there’s no trade off in it for them. They rail
about US domestic support, but I don’t think they really mind. They import US food and
feed, and the fact those products are subsidized means they are cheaper. Ultimately, China
has nothing to gain from an agreement on domestic support.34
And the US is equally obstinate – refusing to consider any solution that does
not include a contribution from China.
While China is not the only emerging economy that is increasing its agricultural
subsidies, it has been the chief target of the US and US-China conflict has domi-
nated the negotiations. In the words of one Secretariat official: ‘the dynamic is pri-
marily between the US and China. The US is overwhelmingly focused on attacking
China, and frankly it’s not talking much about India or the others’.35 Another
seconded this: ‘The real political friction is between the US and China. Clearly, the
US-China relationship is absolutely crucial. We have a standoff where the Chinese
say we’re not going to reduce our domestic support, or even talk about it, unless
you reduce your subsidies – US, you go first’.36 Although India has played a prom-
inent role on the issue of food stockholding (Wilkinson et al. 2014), which involves
securing an exemption from existing subsidy rules, the conflict over creating new
domestic support disciplines has been primarily a fight between the US and China.
This is partly for economic reasons. For the US, China is a far more important
agricultural export market than India: US agricultural exports to China are nearly
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20 times the size of its exports to India.37 The Indian market also remains pro-
tected primarily via high tariffs and other non-tariff barriers rather than subsidies
(USDA, 2016b). But the US focus on China is also a product of their larger eco-
nomic and geopolitical rivalry. As one negotiator summarized, the impasse between
the US and China on subsidies is:
partly related to the role of their defensive positions in agriculture but it is also about
China-US competition in a broader sense. The US looks at things through the prism of
what China would do [under any potential new rules] and China looks at it in exactly the
same way with regards to the US. The politics goes beyond their pure interests in
agriculture.38
Another negotiator echoed this in stating: ‘A big part of this is political – how
heavily China weighs in the US. The political optics of a situation where the US
gives up something and China doesn’t is unfeasible. Regardless of the commercial
considerations, this is the underlying political reality’.39 This fundamental conflict
between the US and China has barred any progress on disciplining agricultural
domestic support.
Addressing domestic support is ‘a priority for virtually all delegations’ (WTO,
2017a), but the negotiations have become blocked by the standoff between the US and
China. To quote one negotiator, ‘these are not small countries that you can just roll
over’.40 With the renewal of negotiations on domestic support, many states hoped for
an outcome at the 2015 Nairobi Ministerial, but the stalemate between the US and
China resulted in the issue being taken off the agenda for the Ministerial. According
to the agriculture negotiations chair, there was ‘near universal’ consensus on the
importance of reaching an agreement on subsidies at the 2017 Buenos Aires
Ministerial, yet nothing was achieved (Bridges Weekly, 2017b). Despite the best efforts
of many states, negotiators describe the prospects of agreement on domestic support
as ‘if not zero, then very close to zero’ and report that ‘there has been no movement
and there are not signs that there will be movement any time soon’.41 Indeed, with
the two most powerful states at the WTO dug in, as a Secretariat official put it, ‘we
don’t have anything even remotely resembling a negotiation’.42
The perspective of developing countries
With the post-Doha negotiations on agricultural subsidies dominated by conflict
between the US and China, developing countries – for whom disciplining and
reducing agricultural subsidies remains of crucial importance – have been largely
sidelined. At the WTO, China continues to present itself as a victim of rich country
subsidies, but elides the role of its own subsidies in victimizing other developing
countries. China justifies its subsidies as necessary for its development, while ignor-
ing the harmful effects of its policies on poorer, weaker countries. China’s argu-
ment, as one negotiator put it, is that its subsidies are ‘morally different’ because it
is a developing country.43 As a WTO official summarized, ‘the debate has become
my subsidies are better than your subsidies’.44 China maintains that its subsidies
support rural development and poverty alleviation, while the US argues that its
subsidies are more responsible because they are less trade-distorting. Yet while
China and the US argue back and forth about ‘who’s support is more virtuous’,
another added, ‘the reality is that the impact on other developing countries is the
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same regardless of where the money is coming from’.45 A developing country
negotiator echoed this: ‘from the perspective of international markets or poor farm-
ers in Africa, it doesn’t matter where it’s coming from – China or the US or
another developed country – the impact is the same’.46
While China’s agriculture policies are informed by important domestic consider-
ations, they have major spillover effects for producers in other countries. China’s
subsidies distort production and trade, displacing imports from the Chinese market
and depressing world prices. Given the volume of subsidies China is providing, its
impact on global markets is significant. China may still be a developing country,
but as a negotiator stated, ‘You have to appreciate the fact that you are so big and
so powerful that your policies have a huge impact on everyone else everywhere in
the world’.47 For smaller developing countries and LDCs, as a former African nego-
tiator stated, ‘We don’t care who is doing the subsidizing. All countries – regardless
of whether they are developed or not – if they are providing subsidies that are
impacting us, they should be disciplined’.48
As a Secretariat official bluntly stated, many states ‘detest what both sides –
China and the US – are doing’.49 Reducing trade-distorting subsidies would have a
significant impact on the livelihoods and welfare of poor farmers around the world.
It is estimated that removing agricultural subsidies would generate nearly $16 bil-
lion in added annual global welfare (Greenville, 2017) and removing all agricultural
trade distortions could reduce the number of extreme poor by 3% (World Bank
and WTO, 2015). Yet despite its importance to developing countries, the US-China
impasse has blocked efforts at the WTO to reform global agricultural subsidies.
Caught in a battle between these two major powers, as one developing country
negotiator summed up, ‘ultimately it’s the little guys that get hurt the most’.50
Don’t poke the dragon
While developing countries are harmed by agricultural subsidies and the US-China
impasse, many are hesitant to challenge China. As a Secretariat official stated: ‘African
countries, LDCs – even though these are small countries, they have this moral weight
because they are poorer than China. So if they start to say ‘your subsidies are bad for
us’ that would be very damaging and dangerous for China’.51 China, however, is
‘extremely defensive. They often don’t even like the facts available being discussed’.52
An advisor to several developing countries summarized the situation as follows:
They’re not stupid – of course they realize these subsidies could be harmful to them. But
it’s very political. They are very careful, very circumspect about directly criticizing China
and the other larger developing countries for political reasons. They don’t want to be seen
as criticizing the emerging powers.53
Many developing countries report that it is more difficult to criticize China and
other emerging powers than it is to criticize the US or EU.54
Developing world solidarity remains a powerful force at the WTO, and develop-
ing countries worry that criticizing China’s trade policies could alienate their most
powerful ally against the US and other advanced-industrialized states. As an
African negotiator stated, ‘a lot of sensitivities remain around showing solidarity’.55
Many developing countries now rely on China as their largest export market and
fear that antagonizing China could jeopardize their access to its market. As one
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major emerging economy agricultural exporter indicated, ‘Internally, we increas-
ingly see our agriculture sector concerned about China’s subsidies, but China is
our biggest agriculture market now, so we have to be very careful’.56 These fears
are not limited to weaker states – even the US agriculture industry shares the same
concerns.57 In addition to their dependence on its market, China also exerts influ-
ence over weaker developing countries through foreign aid and investment. As one
negotiator reported, during China’s 2016 Trade Policy Review, the forum estab-
lished specifically for criticizing a country’s protectionist trade policies, ‘the whole
afternoon, just about every African country took the floor one after another to
thank China for the thing it had built for them – roads, stadiums, airports. In all
my time here, I have never seen anything like that before’.58
At the WTO, China appears to exert greater and more effective influence over
developing countries than the US. As a former negotiator put it: ‘The Americans
are no good in their relations with LDCs. The Africans don’t trust the Americans,
they don’t like them, but they accept that they behave like gorillas’. In contrast to
the more overt, chest-thumping displays of dominance weaker countries are accus-
tomed to from the US, he continued, China’s exercise of power is more subtle:
‘China does things quietly. If they want you to do something, they’ll say quietly
and subtly that you better do it or it will affect our relationship. And you would
know there would be consequences if you didn’t’.59
Consequently, given China’s ‘big political influence’, one developing country
negotiator explained, ‘developing countries are not going to point the finger and
say, “you China – you’re a bad guy, don’t do that anymore”’.60 While developing
countries will not openly or directly criticize China, according to negotiators, ‘they
are starting to voice more oblique complaints – like “we’re suffering from subsi-
dized competition in general,” without specifying where those subsidies are coming
from. If you read between the lines, it’s not difficult to see who they are really talk-
ing about’.61 Similarly, developing countries ‘won’t single out China but instead
will now talk about “big subsidizers” or “big producers”’ and recently they ‘have
started saying “we want to look at trade-distorting support that has the greatest
impact on the products we produce and trade” – without distinguishing between
developed and developing country subsidies’.62 Despite their economic interests at
stake, developing countries thus face significant constraints in their ability to chal-
lenge China’s agricultural subsidies or criticize its role in blocking new disciplines.
Squeezed between two giants: the cotton example
Cotton subsidies provide a striking illustration of the new politics of agricultural
subsidies at the WTO, and how developing country interests have become caught
in the middle of the US-China standoff. Cotton is among the most heavily sup-
ported agricultural commodities and was singled out as a priority area within the
agriculture negotiations because of its importance to the Cotton-4 (C-4) group of
West African cotton producers (Mali, Chad, Benin, Burkina Faso), as well as many
other developing and least-developed countries in Africa and throughout the world.
Cotton is one of the most important crops in sub-Saharan Africa, with some 15
million people directly dependent upon it (Meyer & Terazono, 2014). Some of the
poorest countries in the region rely on it for as much as 40% of their export
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revenues (Singh, 2014). For these countries, cotton is their lifeblood, vital to
employment and reducing poverty (Sneyd, 2016).
As J. P. Singh (2017: 135) argues, ‘cotton is symbolic of the developing world’s
efforts to pry open developed world agricultural markets’ and reap greater benefits
from trade. African cotton producers are among the most competitive in the world,
but the subsidies provided by more affluent countries leave them struggling to
compete in global markets. Increasingly, however, the source of the problem lies
not just with developed countries but China. China and the US are among the
world’s least efficient cotton producers, with their average costs of production four
times higher than some African countries – but thanks to state subsidies and other
distortionary trade policies, China and the US are the second and third largest cot-
ton producers respectively (ICAC, 2016a). There is a pressing need for trade disci-
plines to ensure a fair international market for poor cotton-producing countries,
with reducing global cotton subsidies ‘crucial for millions of farmers who live on
the poverty threshold’ (IDEAS Centre, 2013).
The world cotton market now revolves around China, as the world’s largest con-
sumer, importer (until recent import restrictions), and stockholder of cotton by siz-
able margins, and the second largest producer (after India) (Quark, 2013). As the
location of over half the world’s textile production (USDA, 2015b), China is by far
the most important market for cotton producers in Africa and around the world.
In a sign of how quickly this reorientation of global trade has occurred, in 1999,
Benin, a member of the C-4, had almost no trade with China on cotton, but by
2010, China was the destination for nearly half of Benin’s exports (ICTSD, 2013).
China’s cotton policies therefore have profound global consequences. These effects
are felt most keenly in the countries of West Africa, which are collectively the
world’s second largest cotton exporter (ICAC, 2016a).
Like its broader support for agriculture, China’s cotton subsidies have expanded
dramatically, and China became the world’s largest cotton subsidizer in 2009.
During 2011–13, government purchases at above-market prices led to a massive
accumulation of reserves, doubling the size of world cotton stocks. To draw down
its stocks, China suspended government purchases of cotton in 2014–15, replacing
this with direct payments to producers (ICAC, 2016b). But even after these
reforms, Chinese cotton subsidies were estimated at $5.3 billion in 2015–16 (com-
pared to $1.1 billion for the US) (ICAC, 2016b). China accounts for nearly three-
quarters of the $7.2 billion in cotton subsidies provided worldwide (Figure 5). In
China, cotton subsidies constitute more than 40% of gross farm receipts, compared
to less than 20% in the US (Greenville, 2017).
In addition to heavy subsidies, China supports cotton production by controlling
imports, imposing tariffs of up to 40% on cotton imported outside its WTO-man-
dated TRQ commitment. Given the importance of the Chinese market and the
high tariffs China imposes on cotton, if China were to allow cotton from LDCs to
enter duty free, it would provide a significant boost to African cotton producers.
However, while China has offered Duty-Free Quota-Free (DFQF) access to LDCs,
it excluded many of their most important exports, including cotton (ICTSD, 2013).
When LDCs requested at the WTO that China expand DFQF access to cover cot-
ton, China refused. In fact, since 2014, with the objective of reducing government
stocks, China has sharply restricted imports – to near the level of its WTO TRQ
18 K. HOPEWELL
obligation of about 1 million tones (compared to import levels as much as 6 times
higher in the past) (ICAC, 2016a, 2016b).
With its extraordinary market power and massive cotton stocks, China effect-
ively dictates the market for global cotton prices, leaving farmers in rich and poor
countries alike at the mercy of Chinese government policy (Imboden, 2014; Meyer
& Terazono, 2014). This is evident in the effects of China’s cotton reserves, which
as one exporter summarized, led to ‘a meteoric rise and subsequent crash in global
cotton prices’.63 China’s growing cotton stockpile initially contributed to increasing
world prices, but then when China started selling off its reserves, its imports were
drastically curtailed and global prices plummeted (Anderson, 2017). The global fall-
out from this drop in prices has hit poor countries the hardest (Sneyd, 2016). In
Zambia, for instance, the national farmers union leader reports that there has been
a steep fall in incomes, causing serious pain in a sector that employs 21% of the
population and making life ‘increasingly difficult’ for farmers (Meyer and
Terazono, 2014). Lower prices are expected to continue until China runs down its
enormous stockpile. As one negotiator stated, China’s cotton stocks are ‘the cloud
hanging over the market keeping prices down – and everyone’s fear is that they
will actually export’.64
China’s strategy of using heavy subsidization and import barriers to support its
cotton farmers causes significant harm to farmers elsewhere. As Adam Sneyd
(2016: 41) puts it, China has ‘exported pain’ by transferring hardship to poorer and
weaker countries. Although China’s per capita GDP ($8000) is indeed small com-
pared to that of the US, it vastly exceeds that of the C-4 countries (between $650
and $800).65 China has considerable resources available to address poverty and
rural development, as well as a broad array of alternative policy mechanisms it
could use to achieve these objectives without the harmful spillover effects of trade-
distorting agricultural subsidies.
The importance of the US in global cotton markets – and hence its subsidies –
has diminished; today, world cotton prices are set more by China’s trade policies
Figure 5. Global cotton subsidizers.
Data: ICAC (2016).
Note: Subsidies provided by some countries are too small to be visible.
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than those of the US (IDEAS Centre, 2013). This is not to let the US off the hook.
To be clear, US cotton policies remain part of the problem, but as the volume of
its subsidies and its market share have declined, the impact of its subsidies on glo-
bal markets is now dwarfed by that of China. On cotton, to quote one negotiator:
‘It’s no longer the US that’s most important. Now it’s China. Cotton production is
declining in the US, but in China it’s been growing – along with their subsidies’.66
Consequently, according to Nicolas Imboden (2014) of the IDEAS Center, an NGO
that has been the chief advocate for the C-4 at the WTO: ‘any solution to the cot-
ton issue will have to include China’. As a long-term advocate for developing coun-
tries on the cotton issue argued: ‘At this point, it’s no longer possible to just go
after the US – you have to put China into the same basket because there is no
question they have a major impact on global cotton prices and the exports of the
C-4. Clearly both China and the US have to do something’.67
However, WTO negotiations on cotton have become blocked by the standoff
between the US and China. US cotton subsidies, production and market share have
all fallen since the late-1990s, particularly since its reforms following the Brazil cot-
ton dispute (UNCTAD, 2016). Yet, from the US’s perspective, having reformed its
own cotton programs, it now finds itself the victim of China’s subsidies. As a US
congressional official stated:
Our producers are incredibly frustrated and upset. On cotton, our biggest competitor is
China and look at what they’re doing – their subsidies are huge and they’ve wreaked havoc
on the market with their policies. We went through this tortured process to reform our
cotton programs … and now China is giving support we haven’t since the ’80s. We
eliminated our programs and now the consequences of what China is doing are bearing
down on markets, with prices collapsing, and our guys don’t have the programs to support
them. It makes folks furious. Anything that demands more of us in isolation, that puts our
producers at a disadvantage, it’s just not fair. With all that China’s doing, we’d just be
handing over the market to them.68
The US thus refuses to further reduce its cotton subsidies if China’s are not
similarly disciplined.
However, for China, its cotton subsidies are considered untouchable, a matter of
national security as well as agricultural policy. The autonomous region of Xinjiang – a
restive area in the northwest home to China’s Muslim Uighur minority, whose separ-
atist movement has been violently suppressed – accounts for more than half of
China’s cotton production. There most cotton is grown by the Xinjiang Production
and Construction Corps, a quasi-military agricultural conglomerate consisting of Han
Chinese settlers (Hornby, 2015). As one former Chinese official stated:
Cotton in China is extremely political. Most cotton is produced in Xinjiang, where there is
lots of regional and political instability – like Tibet. And that is where China is devoting
lots of resources to supporting producers. Otherwise they will want to separate. So when
others try to say you can’t support your cotton producers, no way. It’s like asking the US
to stop supporting the rust belt – or its cotton producers, for that matter.69
China has therefore thwarted efforts to discipline its cotton subsidies at the WTO.
China is now a significant part of the cotton problem, but it has sought to evade
any responsibility in WTO cotton negotiations. One negotiator characterized its
strategy as, ‘we’re the elephant, but we just have to make our self as little and as
invisible as possible’.70 China continues to insist that all blame for the cotton prob-
lem lies solely with the US and maintain that as a developing country it is on the
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same side as the African countries and LDCs in fighting the US. As another negoti-
ator stated, ‘China keeps insisting ‘cotton is not our issue’. They are trying to keep
out of it – and they manage to because others are not putting them on the spot’.71
As in the domestic support negotiations more broadly, the C-4 and other cotton-
producing developing countries are extremely reluctant to complain about China’s
policies: as one of their advisors explained, ‘They’re afraid of China. They hate the
Americans and Europeans but they’re not afraid of them. They feel dependent on
China [as the biggest cotton market]. And of course China is also giving lots of
money to these countries’.72 China is providing substantial sums of aid, investment
and credit across the developing world. Plus, following in the footsteps of the US,
China is now attempting to evade pressures to reform its cotton policies by provid-
ing aid to cotton-producing countries in Africa – as one negotiator bluntly summar-
ized, ‘that’s what happens – give them money to make them shut up’.73 The value
of this aid, however, is only a small fraction of the potential gains that could be
reaped by poor countries from the elimination of cotton subsidies.
Given their cost-competitiveness, the removal of global cotton subsidies would
lead to a significant shift in production to African countries and increased trade
volumes sourced from the region (Greenville, 2017). But, as with the broader nego-
tiations on domestic support, efforts to negotiate new disciplines on cotton have
become mired in finger-pointing between the US and China. As one negotiator
from an African cotton-producing LDC summarized:
The US says ‘China, you tell us you only subsidize poor farmers, but if you look in
aggregate, you see how important they are in distorting the market’. Then the argument
from China is ‘we’re not exporting, you the US are exporting, so you are more dangerous
for the C-4 and LDCs than me’. China points at the US like it is guilty and the US in
return points to China as guilty. It’s like ping pong. ‘You’re responsible.’ ‘No, not me,
you’re responsible.’ But, in the end, both have the same impact on us [the C-4 and LDCs]
and nothing is being done.74
Another negotiator similarly observed:
Cotton acreage in the US is declining. Increasingly the US has said we can negotiate this
issue if China’s policies are on the table as well. But that’s politically impossible for China.
So the poor C-4 countries are just getting squeezed between the two giants. China has dug
in its heels, the US has dug in its heels, and there’s been virtually no progress on cotton.75
Meanwhile, however, he continued, ‘the real market dynamics, beyond the games
people play at WTO, really matter for the lives of people on the ground – they have
real consequences’. While both the US and China present themselves as victims of
the other’s agricultural subsidies, arguably the chief victims in this battle are the
world’s poorest and most vulnerable developing countries. With the system’s two
dominant powers at loggerheads, each blaming the other for the cotton problem,
efforts to discipline cotton subsidies via the WTO have come to a standstill.
Conclusion
As this analysis has shown, while agricultural subsidies remain a highly contentious
issue at the WTO, the dynamics of the negotiations have changed dramatically as a
result of contemporary power shifts. The traditional conception of the agricultural
subsidies issue – articulated through a North-South lens with the US and other
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developed countries as perpetrators and developing countries as victims – has been
turned on its head by China’s emergence as the world’s largest subsidizer. From a
North-South struggle, the primary axis of conflict at the WTO has shifted to a bat-
tle between the US and China, heavily shaped by the hegemonic rivalry between
the two states. An intractable conflict between the US and China has thwarted any
progress on the establishment of a new and strengthened set of disciplines on agri-
cultural subsidies, with negative consequences for much of the developing world.
If, as many have argued, agricultural subsidies are a critical test of the legitimacy
of the multilateral trading system and its ability to work for weaker states, this ana-
lysis underscores its failure. Developing countries remain at the mercy of the major
powers. Amid a clash between the US and China, developing countries and their
interests have been sidelined. The US and other advanced-industrialized states were
once viewed as the chief barrier to making the trading system work for developing
countries. However, what the case of agricultural subsidies shows is that it is no
longer just the US or other rich countries that are barring important changes to
global trade rules that would benefit developing countries but also China. China
has become a major part of the problem: together with the US, it is now blocking
pro-development reform of the trading system at the WTO.
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